Policy paper

Post-Southport review into Prevent and Axel Rudakubana: terms of reference

Updated 2 June 2025

Background

1. On 20 January, Axel Rudakubana (Rudakubana) pleaded guilty to all 16 charges related to the attack that took place in Southport on 29 July 2024. Now that the trial is over, a number of further details about Rudakubana바카라 사이트檚 history have been made public, including that he had a Prevent footprint.

2. Rudakubana was referred to Prevent three times. First in December 2019 at the age of 13, and then subsequently in February 2021 and April 2021 at the age of 14. On each occasion he was assessed by local Prevent Officers working for Counter Terrorism Policing, and in each instance the referral was deemed not to be appropriate for Channel support.

3. Once made aware of his engagement with the Prevent programme in the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Home Secretary and Counter Terrorism Policing HQ jointly commissioned a Prevent Learning Review (PLR) to understand the extent of the interactions. The PLR was published on 5 February.

Purpose and remit of the review

4. The purpose of the post-Southport review is to ensure that lessons from this specific case have been learned, to assess whether wider changes to Prevent have been implemented effectively and to identify whether further changes are required in the short term.

5. The remit of the Review is to assess engagement between Rudakubana and Prevent for the period December 2019 to May 2021. Events outside this period will be considered by the Interim Commissioner should he consider it necessary.

6. The PLR was conducted in Summer 2024, by Tony Jenkyn of Jenkyn Prevent Consultancy and Training Ltd. The PLR was completed against tight time constraints which made accessing all of the relevant information difficult and had to operate within the limitations placed on it by the ongoing investigation. As such, the Interim Commissioner may wish to use the gaps/limitations referenced in the PLR as a starting point to identify if further learning regarding the specific handling of the case is needed, and whether it indicates (considering improvements already made) that there are gaps remaining, or more fundamental policy changes required.

7. The relationship between the Interim Commissioner바카라 사이트檚 review and both the Public Inquiry and Coronial Inquest will need to be formally agreed once work on both is at a more advanced stage. We have asked that the draft Terms of Reference for the Public Inquiry will include a commitment to engage with the Interim Commissioner. It is also likely that the report produced by the Interim Commissioner will need to be provided to both the Public Inquiry and Coronial Inquest.

8. The objectives of the review are to:

• a. Identify whether there is further learning regarding the specific handling of the case, and if there are any additional findings to add to the PLR now that more information is known/accessible.

• b. Determine whether appropriate and effective action has been taken to implement the findings of the PLR.

• c. Examine improvements made to Prevent since 2021, when Rudakubana was last referred in, and determine whether they have sufficiently strengthened the Prevent system.

• d. Identify remaining gaps or shortcomings that require further improvement and assure action to address them.

Duration and publication

9. The review, and subsequent report, must be completed during the Interim Commissioner바카라 사이트檚 tenure.

10. Following the conclusion of the review, the Interim Commissioner will submit his findings to the Home Secretary. A decision will then be taken on publication, as consideration will also need to be given to the interaction between the Interim Commissioner바카라 사이트檚 report and both the Public Inquiry and Coronial Inquest (see paragraph 7).

Oversight

11. This review has been commissioned by the Home Secretary and the Interim Commissioner may direct any queries to Director, Home Office Strategy. Policy detail, as necessary, will be provided by the Prevent Directorate.

Resourcing

12. The Interim Commissioner will operate independently of the Prevent Directorate, but will report into and be supported by the Home Office. The Interim Commissioner will be provided support appropriate to fulfil his responsibilities, including research or analytical support.

Information sharing

13. The Interim Commissioner must be able to request that the below named organisations provide all information, data and other material that is relevant or potentially relevant to this Review, without limitation based on the classified nature of such material or otherwise. The Interim Commissioner must also be granted access, if required, to all personnel who may have information or evidence relevant to this Review. This is to ensure the Interim Commissioner has access to the information needed to conduct a thorough review:

• a. Merseyside Police

• b. Lancashire Constabulary

• c. Counter-Terrorism Policing

• d. Lancashire County Council

• e. Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board

• f. Department of Health and Social Care

• g. Department for Education

• h. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 바카라 사이트

• i. Home Office

• j. Ministry of Justice

• k. Department for Education

• l. Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local 바카라 사이트

• m. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

• n. MI5

14. The Prevent Directorate will share relevant information and data, and arrange access to relevant Prevent personnel, with the Interim Commissioner and respond to reasonable requests for new analysis to support the Interim Commissioner in a timely manner.

15. The Prevent Directorate will ensure the sharing of information and data, and arrange access to relevant personnel, for the wider Counter-Terrorism system, Other 바카라 사이트 Departments, local authorities and operational partners including Counter-Terrorism Policing and Merseyside Police.

16. The Home Office Sponsorship Unit will ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for the Interim Commissioner to store and access classified and sensitive material.

17. The Interim Commissioner will:

• i. Be clear when requesting information and data, for what purpose it will be used for and how it links to the review commissioned by the Home Secretary.

• ii. Adhere to the Home Office Data Protection Policy v1.1 (Data and Identity Directorate) in the storing of any data sets.

18. The Interim Commissioner is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as he is not listed as an independent public authority in Schedule 1 to the FOIA.

19. Where the Interim Commissioner has requested information he considers relevant to his work, and that has not been forthcoming from negotiations at working level, the below escalation process should be followed:

• i. The Interim Commissioner will inform the Prevent Directorate of the request made, how it is relevant to his work, the key objections to release of the information, and how he has attempted to resolve the issue.

• ii. If the Prevent Directorate are satisfied that it is a reasonable request and that the Interim Commissioner has exhausted his options, they will escalate to the Home Office Senior Sponsor (Director Home Office Strategy) to resolve with relevant partner.

• iii. If still not forthcoming, the matter will be escalated to the Home Office Director General responsible for the Interim Commissioner (DG Homeland Security) to raise bilaterally with counterparts.

Clearance

20. The Interim Commissioner has DV clearance until October 2025, allowing for access to material considered higher classification. Any supporting staff utilised for the review will also be put through clearance processes as necessary to enable the effective undertaking of duties.

Conflicts of interest

21. Potential conflicts of interest should be raised with Director Home Office Strategy immediately, and appropriate action taken to manage them.